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Abstract 
 
Criminalising membership of terrorist organizations raises serious freedom of association and 
freedom of speech/expression concerns. Governments in the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom have a long history of restricting organisations which express dissent, 
particularly at times when they perceive national security to be subject to acute threat. Until 
the mid-twentieth century, both jurisdictions regarded proscription as the appropriate means 
of tackling political organisations which were committed to using violence to achieve their 
goals or equivocal about their attitude to violence. Thereafter, the approaches of these two 
jurisdictions to proscription diverged. This paper analyses these distinct approaches to 
tackling terrorist organisations by comparing their proscription offences, the mechanisms for 
listing organisations as terrorist, and whether adequate safeguards for freedom of association 
and freedom of speech/expression are provided in both jurisdictions. It also evaluates the 
effectiveness of such proscription regimes as a response to the threat posed by “networked” 
groups which actively adapt to the efforts by states to tackle their activities by listing them as 
terrorist.  
 
Introduction 
 
When states employ their criminal justice system to tackle terrorism ‘a heavily modified 
criminal process’ often results, featuring novel rules of procedure and evidence gathering, as 
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well as counter-terrorism offences which dramatically extend the nature of criminal conduct.
1
 
Such modifications build into what Karl Loewenstein described in the 1930s as a ‘militant 
democracy’; a liberal-democratic governance order which has supposedly shaken off 
‘legalistic self-complacency’ in response to an existential threat.2 Writing in the 1930s, 
Loewenstein regarded such an approach as essential to defeating fascist and communist 
groups seeking to abuse rights and liberties maintained by liberal democracies to subvert such 
governance orders, but the threat posed by groups such as al Qaeda, Islamic State and 
extreme right-wing terrorism has brought renewed attention to militant democracy theory.
3
 
For Louise Richardson, protections for freedom of association make liberal democracies 
‘convenient operating grounds for terrorism’.4 Militant democracy theory therefore seeks to 
legitimate the criminalisation of manifestations of political identity and thereby undermine 
the support base of groups linked to political violence.
5
 In the United States (US) criminal 
prosecution on the basis of support groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs) has become ‘a critical mode of response’ to terrorism.6 In the United Kingdom (UK) 
the criminalisation of membership of banned groups, as the UK Government explained on the 
occasion of banning the extreme right-wing group National Action, ‘is an important part of 
the Government’s strategy to disrupt the full range of terrorist activities’.7 These measures are 
not primarily intended to tackle active participants in terrorist cells, as such activity is already 
covered by offences of criminal conspiracy.
8
 Instead they provide a basis for criminalising 
broader adherence to a targeted group, with the UK Government placing considerable 
emphasis in banning National Action that its ‘views and ideology stand in direct contrast to 
the core values of Britain and the United Kingdom’.9 This article explores the uneasy 
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relationship between such claims and official assurances that proscription ‘is not targeted at 
any particular faith, social group or ideological motivation’.10 
The UK proscription and US designation regimes harness the inherent flexibility in 
criminal justice standards to attempt to shut “banned” groups off from society. But there must 
be limits to this flexibility when a liberal democracy responds to terrorism.
11
 The erosion of 
established criminal justice safeguards threatens the rule of law, and in doing so can de-
legitimate counter-terrorism efforts.
12
 Measures which hollow out such safeguards also attract 
potentially embarrassing legal challenges on the basis of fundamental rights.
13
 This latter 
concern has long resonated in the US, where counter-terrorism policy has been channelled by 
established constitutional rights.
14
 By contrast, the absence of any higher-order constitutional 
rights in the UK’s legal systems led generations of US-based constitutional theorists to 
marvel at the special measures adopted in the UK to tackle security threats.
15
 Their 
successors maintain that were the US Congress to enact many of the counter-terrorism 
measures currently employed in the UK, they would violate the protections contained within 
the Bill of Rights.
16
 In comparative terms, militant democracy theory therefore appears to fit 
much more naturally within the UK’s constitutional order. This article uses militant 
democracy theory to examine the overlaps which remain between the legal regimes intended 
to disrupt organisations which the UK and US governments believe threaten political 
violence. The US designation and UK proscription provisions, enacted before the 9/11 attacks 
and extended thereafter, may not be the most high-profile elements of these countries 
counter-terrorism responses, but they criminalise association with banned groups, short of the 
level of conduct which would ordinarily be expected under the criminal law.
17
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The proscription/designation regimes confront us with the question of whether these 
countries are criminalising individuals for simply manifesting their beliefs, and thereby 
facilitate a comparative analysis of whether ‘militant democracy’ theory has taken root within 
their legal orders. This article first evaluates the development of designation/proscription 
powers and outlines their value as counter-terrorism measures. Although the US and UK 
share a common legal history, their designation/proscription regimes have been conditioned 
by the different protections for freedom of association and freedom of speech/expression 
within their legal orders. The second part of the article addresses how and why US and UK 
approaches towards proscription diverged in the later twentieth century, with the US courts 
challenging the “guilt-by-association” rationale of group bans under protections of freedom 
of speech. As we shall see in the third section of this article, the usefulness of proscription to 
the authorities has seen renewed efforts to circumvent these restrictions within the US and 
further extensions to proscription powers in the UK. This continued focus on proscription is 
of questionable counter-terrorism value; measures which are reactive against organised 
groups already known to the authorities seem ill-designed as responses to the contemporary 
threat posed by “networked” terrorist groups. Moreover, although designation/proscription 
powers have proven to be adaptable counter-terrorism tools, these cumulative adaptations 
could now be undermining the legitimacy of the US and UK criminal justice systems. The 
time has come to reassess this continued reliance on measures which criminalise political 
identity. 
 
The Emergence of Proscription  
 
The term proscription has its origins in the twilight years of the Roman Republic. Appearance 
on a list of individuals promulgated in 82 BCE by Sulla and by the triumvirate of Marcus 
Antonius, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus and Gaius Iulius Caesar Octavianus in 43 BCE 
amounted to a death sentence.
18
 The Fourth Act of William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
opens with the triumvirate, having driven Caesar’s assassins from Rome, locked in 
discussions over whom to proscribe. Mark Antony settles the issue by declaring that ‘[t]hese 
many, then, shall die; their names are prick’d’.19 Proscription became a modern security 
measure, however, when it was transformed from a method of “outlawing” listed individuals 
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to criminalising any association with banned organisations.
20
 Criminalising the mere fact of 
membership of a particular group was an infamous feature of the Terror which followed the 
French Revolution. The Law of Suspects of 1793 made it an offence to support the Girondin 
deputies’ proposals, in effect criminalising association with this political faction.21 
Under the shadow of the French Revolution, William Pitt’s administration ‘saw in 
rapidly developing working-class organisations and in the mass acceptance of [Thomas] 
Paine, an overt threat to every value to which they clung’.22 It sought to avert revolution by 
tackling groups which espoused radical political views and opposed war with France.
23
 Failed 
attempts to prosecute the leaders of the London Corresponding Society, including radical 
shoemaker Thomas Hardy,
24
 for treason, highlighted the difficulty with using ancient 
criminal offences when groups had not perpetrated or advocated violent acts. Indeed, the 
acquittals went some way to embolden radical groups in the capital.
25
 Temporary extensions 
to treason and sedition were therefore enacted,
26
 and the Government’s desire for pre-emptive 
action satisfied by the suspension of habeas corpus (permitting detention of individuals on the 
basis of mere suspicion
27
), but these responses generated widespread discontent. The problem 
was how to counter organisations which may be spreading revolutionary sentiment within the 
working classes without impinging upon the activities of aristocratic debating societies. The 
Government’s solution came against the backdrop of the uprising organised by the United 
Irishmen in 1798, which Pitt used to persuade a frightened Parliament to pass the 
Corresponding Societies Act 1799.
28
 This Act banned membership of specific groups ‘whose 
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existence was regarded as detrimental to the state’29 including the United Irishmen and 
London Corresponding Society.
30
 The wave of arrests that followed stifled the latter 
organisation. The Act, as a future Solicitor General would point out, went beyond 
suppressing named organisations; ‘it also declared other societies to be unlawful which were 
constituted in a particular way, such as imposing oaths, engagements, tests, declarations, 
&c.’.31 Although the legislation would remain in force for much of the nineteenth century, 
this test would prove too tailored to the secret societies of the 1790s to of long-term use.  
The Corresponding Societies Act might therefore have become all-but-unusable within 
decades, but the UK continued to make extensive use of powers to ban groups which 
threatened the social order. Passed alongside the Corresponding Societies Act, the 
Combination Act 1799
32
 prohibited the operation of trade unions. In 1887, faced with the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood, Parliament permitted the authorities in Ireland to proclaim 
associations with republican aims to be dangerous.
33
 Such measures changed proscription 
from a legislative means to criminalise involvement with specific groups into broad powers, 
delegated to the executive branch, to ban a range of organisations which shared certain means 
or aims. Proscription soon became the remedy prescribed across the British Empire when 
groups were labelled a threat to society. The Unlawful Associations Act 1916-17,
34
 for 
example, was part of a concerted effort by the Australian Government to silence opposition to 
the First World War by banning organisations such as the International Workers of the World 
(IWW). In line with the developing pattern for proscription regimes, when some IWW 
factions began organising under different names to avoid the ban, an amendment was swiftly 
introduced ‘to authorise the government to declare any organization illegal whose purposes 
were proscribed’.35 In subsequent years, amidst fears sparked by the Russian Revolution and 
exaggerated accounts of IWW efforts to sabotage US entry into the First World War, over 
twenty US state legislatures would follow Australia’s lead by enacting “criminal 
syndicalism” laws against radical workers’ organisations.36 These measures banned the 
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knowing membership or organisation of any group dedicated to promoting or participating in 
criminal syndicalism, which was defined under the influential Idaho statute as ‘the doctrine 
which advocates crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of 
accomplishing industrial or political reform’.37 Although the IWW was the initial focus of 
these provisions, over the next half century this broad framework allowed their adaptation to 
curtail the activities of a swathe of dissident groups.
38
  
 
Justifying Proscription 
 
Proscription criminalises the membership of, or showing support for, an organisation on the 
basis that its continued existence is in some way inimical to the public good. The power is 
intended to destabilise a group’s structure and stifle its message without the authorities 
having to establish any more substantive criminal action on the part of adherents than the 
mere fact of voluntary membership or some voluntary show of support. To maintain the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice process, official accounts of membership offences have 
often drawn parallels to criminal conspiracy.
39
 Membership offences, however, widen the net 
of criminalisation beyond the co-conspirators active within terrorist cells,
40
 potentially 
‘catching persons whose connection with terrorist acts is at best indirect’.41 Proscription 
provides a means to criminalise the “political” aspect of terrorist conduct, although in a 
distinct manner from classifying certain motivations for crime as aggravating factors. Under 
race-relations legislation, courts in England and Wales are required to increase sentences 
imposed upon individuals who perpetrate violent offences on the basis of racist motivations.
42
 
In the counter-terrorism context, in the case of a politically-motivated assassination believed 
to have been carried out by the members of a banned group, charging suspects with 
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40
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membership offences alongside murder allows the authorities to address the challenge of 
politically-motivated violence to constitutional politics.
43
  
Few terrorists, however, are so naïve as to carry incriminating evidence of their 
membership of a banned organisation, notwithstanding the convictions of the rather hapless 
defendants in Hundal,
44
 who arrived in the UK carrying membership cards and paraphernalia 
bearing the name and insignia of a banned organisation. This makes it difficult to realise the 
prosecutorial dividend ascribed to proscription. The difficulty in securing convictions on the 
basis of bare membership of a group does not, however, negate the value of proscription, but 
shifts the primary rationale for the power onto its “presentational” effects. Proscription 
expresses ‘public aversion to organisations which use, and espouse, violence as a means to a 
political end’.45 Proscription therefore provides some symbolic support for constitutional 
politics; it seeks to deter some individuals from joining violent groups and to dissuade others 
from undertaking “revenge attacks” in response to terrorist outrages.46 Nonetheless, even 
carefully-targeted banning orders amount to something of a double-edged sword; ‘their effect 
is to drive underground (thereby making harder to penetrate) a membership that is committed 
to a programme that involves criminal acts’.47 In attempting to tackle terrorism emanating 
from Northern Ireland in the 1970s, the then Home Secretary cautioned that any banned 
group would soon ‘reappear under a multiplicity of different names’.48 These concerns did 
not prevent the subsequent extension of proscription powers throughout the UK. Indeed, just 
months after he struck this cautionary note, Roy Jenkins rushed such legislation through 
Parliament, not because of much hope that doing so would prevent terrorist attacks, but 
because ‘the public should no longer have to endure the affront of public demonstrations in 
support of [terrorist groups]’.49 The groups involved in the Northern Ireland conflict were, 
nonetheless, particularly susceptible to proscription because they were monolithic and 
                                                 
43
 Viscount Colville, examining the use of proscription during the Northern Ireland conflict, noted that 
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44
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46
 See Brice Dickson, ‘Law versus Terrorism: Can Law Win?’ [2005] European Human Rights Law Review 11, 
16-17. 
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organised in a hierarchical fashion.
50
 Today, however, both the US and UK Governments 
maintain that much of the terrorist threat emanates from an ever-changing patchwork of 
‘networked’51 groups and ‘lone wolves’52 inspired by al Qaeda or Islamic State but rarely, if 
ever, subject to their direct control.
53
  
Persisting with bans on named groups, when the evidence to suggest fixed 
organisational structures is often scant, smacks of retaining a response because of its 
familiarity rather than its effectiveness. Indeed, the changed nature of terrorism only 
amplifies the risks of misuse of proscription: 
 
Where wrongly applied, the orders choke off political discussion that should be allowed 
in a liberal democracy as a matter of principle. It needs to be remembered as well that 
such bans often reach well beyond the bodies subject to them, being both over-broadly 
interpreted by the authorities and misconstrued by the general public as prohibitions on 
whole categories of speech.
54
 
 
Even with these drawbacks, in the context of an internationalised counter-terrorism response 
which obliges the US and UK to work with self-interested foreign regimes, proscription 
powers can operate as a useful lever for securing cooperation. It may well appear axiomatic 
that ‘when a state declares an organisation a terrorist one, it views this organisation as an 
enemy and consequently its relations with other states, which do not share this view, 
deteriorate’.55 The inverse of this statement, however, is just as important to security policy. 
By banning organisations which pose a threat to partner governments, the US and UK 
Governments can extend a relatively inexpensive olive branch in the hope of garnering 
intelligence concerning al Qaeda, Islamic State and their offshoots.
56
 Failing to take action 
                                                 
50
 The authorities, however, frequently overstated their operational knowledge of the command structures of 
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51
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53
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54
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55
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56
 See Mark Muller, ‘Terrorism, Proscription, and the Right to Resist in the Age of Conflict’ (2008) 20 Denning 
Law Journal 111, 119-120. 
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against a group which operates against a potential or active partner state, by contrast, risks 
‘undermining cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist attacks’.57 
 
The Late-Twentieth Century: Divergent US and UK Approaches  
 
 
In the US criminal syndicalism offences became a focal point of the struggle for freedom of 
speech and association in the 1950s and 1960s. In this era, members of groups as diverse as 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Communist 
Party and the Ku Klux Klan claimed that either Federal or state legislation impeding their 
ability to organise contravened their freedom of association, which they argued was inherent 
within the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
58
 The suppression of the Communist Party and 
associated groups under the Smith Act
59
 was the most high-profile example of the use of 
Federal law to outlaw the membership of an organisation in this era. In Dennis v United 
States,
60
 the Supreme Court rejected assertions that this legislation violated the First 
Amendment on the basis that members of the Communist Party were engaged in a conspiracy 
to overthrow the US Government. The plurality of justices, led by Chief Justice Vinson, 
adopted a conception of freedom of speech by which the content of the right varied according 
to the threat that statements (and the group behind them) posed to society. This approach 
required the courts to assess ‘whether the gravity of the “evil,” discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger’.61 
Criminalisation of Communist Party membership was found to be acceptable under this test, 
with this outcome predetermined by the Supreme Court’s ‘risk assumptions’.62 In accepting 
widespread restrictions on association with the Communist Party, including the imposition of 
loyalty oaths by bodies such as universities and trade unions,
63
 the Court was explicitly 
concerned with the underlying potential for the use of political violence at the behest of the 
                                                 
57
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Party to further its ends; ‘The international police state has crept over Eastern Europe by 
deception, coercion, coup d’état, terrorism and assassination. Not only has it overpowered its 
critics and opponents; it has usually liquidated them’.64  
Under Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court moved decisively away from this 
approach to freedom of speech and association. In NAACP v Alabama
65
 it ruled that a court 
order requiring the NAACP to disclose membership records violated the organisation’s 
freedom of association. This case marked the beginnings of the concept of expressive 
association, by which the Court linked the association of individuals to the freedom of speech 
it was intended to advance.
66
 Mere membership of the Communist Party, without evidence of 
personal intention to further violent insurrection, was treated as protected.
67
 Brandenburg v 
Ohio
68
 capped this jurisprudence. The Supreme Court invalidated Ohio’s criminal 
syndicalism law, which had criminalised ‘voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism’,69 
and under which Ku Klux Klan leader Charles Brandenburg had been convicted. After 
Brandenburg, advocacy would have to be ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and … [be] likely to incite or produce such action’70 before it could be criminal. In 
Roberts v United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court affirmed that freedom of association was 
protected as a corollary to freedom of speech, stating that ‘we have long understood as 
implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding 
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends’.71 Having accepted that association was protected 
alongside speech which did not advocate imminent violence, the Supreme Court accepted 
that offences criminalising mere membership of an organisation, without evidence of 
participation in unlawful activities, imposed a form of ‘guilt by association’ which was ‘alien 
to traditions of a free society’.72 For Mark Tushnet, the US might have ‘briefly flirted with 
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65
 NAACP v Alabama ex rel. Patterson (1958) 357 US 449. 
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the idea that some political organizations might be so threatening to the political order that 
they might be outlawed’, but the Court had pulled back from this position.73  
Although the decades of practice that preceded these cases certainly amounted to more 
than a flirtation, this relinquishment of proscription powers in the 1960s contrasts starkly with 
the UK’s wholehearted embrace of such powers in the same period. Proscription was first 
employed as part of efforts to counter terrorism in the Northern-Ireland context and, having 
proven its usefulness, would be repurposed as a mechanism for addressing international as 
well as domestic terrorist threats. A year after the US Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brandenburg v Ohio the case of McEldowney v Forde reached the UK House of Lords.
74
 
With the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict in the late 1960s the Unionist Government, 
which dominated the then Northern Ireland Parliament, reacted by clamping down on Irish 
republican organisations. John McEldowney was found to be a member of the Slaughtneil 
Republican Club, in breach of the Special Powers Regulations.
75
 These provisions proscribed 
organisations such as the IRA and ‘any like organisations howsoever described’. No evidence 
was presented that either McEldowney or the Club, which was a local branch of the Gaelic 
Athletic Association, were at any time a threat to peace. Nonetheless, the House of Lords’ 
majority upheld the regulations as valid. Lord Pearson found that organisations deemed to be 
unlawful under these valid regulations included (i) any organisation describing itself as a 
“republican club,” whatever its actual objects may be, and (ii) any organisation which has the 
characteristic object of a republican club, namely, to introduce republican government into 
Northern Ireland, whatever its name may be.
76
 Lord Diplock, dissenting, was much less 
comfortable with this provision’s breadth:  
 
It is possible to speculate that the Minister when he made the regulation now 
challenged bona fide believed that the sort of club which at that date described itself as 
a “republican club” was likely to have unlawful objects which would endanger the 
preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order and by the words that he added 
he may have intended to do no more than to prevent such clubs from evading the 
regulation by dissolving and re-forming or by changing their names. If this was his 
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intention he signally failed to express it in the regulation, for by no process of 
construction can it be given this limited effect.
77
  
 
Brandenburg v Ohio and McEldowney v Forde illustrate how the legal systems of the 
US and UK came to adopt diametrically opposing conceptions of freedom of association and 
the criminalisation of membership of dissident organisations. This divergence was 
underpinned by the different value attached to freedom of speech/expression and association 
under the US Bill of Rights and under the UK’s common-law protections of civil liberties. 
The US Constitution seeks to channel criminal law responses: 
 
When the government claims that a political party or group threatens democracy, the 
individualistic tendency in US constitutional law almost instinctively shifts from the 
group to its individual members, allowing regulation when an identified individual has 
engaged in threatening action, but not simply on the basis of the individual’s affiliation 
with an extremist group.
78
 
 
By contrast, even when confronted with a statute which criminalised membership of a non-
violent organisation which merely shared some objectives with terrorist groups, the House of 
Lords majority in McEldowney v Forde was unwilling to adopt a restrictive interpretation of 
the statutory proscription power because of the security interests at stake.
79
 This divergence 
continues even after the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
80
 was incorporated 
into the UK’s domestic legal systems through the Human Rights Act 1998.  
Banning a group potentially infringes both freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR) 
and freedom of association (Article 11 ECHR).
81
 Under the ECHR, however, these rights are 
hedged with greater limitations than freedom of speech under the US Bill of Rights. 
Qualifications on the freedom of expression and association are acceptable provided that they 
are proportionate to the need to secure important community interests, including public order 
and national security. The European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence permits 
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restrictions, including enforced dissolution and consequent criminalisation of membership, 
when organisations are linked to political violence or maintain counter-democratic aims.
82
 In 
the Refah Partisi
83
 case the Grand Chamber explained the three factors which underpinned its 
assessment of state action which restricted a political organisation: 
 
(i) whether there was plausible evidence that the risk to democracy, supposing it had 
been proved to exist, was sufficiently imminent; (ii) whether the acts and speeches of 
the leaders and members of the political party concerned were imputable to the party as 
a whole; and (iii) whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party formed 
a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived and advocated by 
the party which was incompatible with the concept of a “democratic society”.84 
 
Despite its superficial resemblance to the US Supreme Court’s approach, this formulation 
leaves ‘more room for case by case balancing than does the stricter “imminent lawless 
action” prong under Brandenburg’.85 As subsequent jurisprudence establishes, ECHR states 
enjoy considerable latitude where groups give even ‘tacit support’ to acts of violence 
committed in furtherance of their political aims.
86
 The closer the connection between an 
organisation and political violence, the more likely restrictions upon the rights to expression 
and association will be justified.
87
 Such restrictions must also be ‘prescribed by law’, which 
requires provisions to have sufficient clarity to guide individual conduct.
88
 In sum, there is 
‘little doubt that the proscription and dissolution of terrorist organisations would not raise 
serious Article 11 obstacles’.89 
Against this relatively compliant backdrop the UK reconsidered its proscription 
arrangements at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Terrorism Act 2000, in 
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contrast to the avowedly temporary and largely domestic-focused measures which preceded 
it, established ‘a more unified and permanent regime … with a greater emphasis upon 
international terrorism’.90 The first tranche of counter-terrorism powers contained within this 
new Act covered the proscription of terrorist organisations
91
 and attendant offences for 
individuals linked to banned groups.
92
 The Home Secretary has the power to issue a statutory 
instrument (which must be approved by the UK Parliament) to proscribe any organisation 
which she believes to be ‘concerned in terrorism’.93 This ‘clumsy term’94 covers committing, 
participating in, promoting or, in a circular catch-all element of the definition, being in some 
other way concerned in terrorism.
95
 The interpretation of this term has been left to the 
courts.
96
 Once a group is banned it becomes ‘a criminal offence for a person to belong to a 
proscribed organisation, invite support for a proscribed organisation, arrange a meeting in 
support of a proscribed organisation, or wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse 
reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed 
organisation’.97 The combination of these offences is explicitly intended to foreclose outlets 
by which terrorist groups might engage with wider society in their effort to gain recruits or 
support, with little concern for any guilt-by-association critique.  
 
The US Designation Regime and the Post-9/11 Threat 
 
Following the US Supreme Court’s phased recognition of the unconstitutionality of banning 
domestic dissident groups, proscription fell into disuse. This did not mean, however, that 
successive US administrations did not appreciate the usefulness of such a power.
98
 When 
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international terrorism began to pose an increasing threat to US interests, the issue became 
not whether a proscription regime for terrorist organisations would be useful, but how to 
engineer one which would circumvent the strictures imposed by the Court. The first phase of 
the response came in the 1970s and 1980s, when the State Department took advantage of 
jurisprudence that foreign nationals could be excluded from the US without reference to First 
Amendment rights of US citizens thereby prevented from associating with them
99
 to exclude 
members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.
100
 These immigration exclusions came 
to depend on whether a foreign national had provided material support for terrorism. In the 
wake of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing Congress adapted this immigration power 
into the basis of the criminal offence of direct material support for terrorist activities, codified 
at 18 USC section 2339A.
101
 Once offences linked to the designation of a group as terrorist 
had entered Federal criminal law they were swiftly extended. In 1996, in the immediate 
aftermath of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the US 
Secretary of State
102
 gained the power to designate any group based outside the US as an 
FTO if it engages in terrorist activity, or has in the past done so and retains the capability and 
intent to do so.
103
 Providing any prohibited form of aid to any such organisation would trigger 
the new offence, codified as 18 USC section 2339B.
104
 This measure did not criminalise 
membership, as mere membership would not satisfy the requirement of personal culpable 
action, but it expanded the circumstances in which it would be criminal for an individual to 
provide material support. This offence was more useful to prosecutors than the older section 
2339A; ‘there was no need to determine whether the specific aid was of a type that supported 
specific terrorist activity or that it did in fact support terrorist activity’.105 Working in 
combination with the law of criminal attempts and conspiracy this meant that all that is 
required for a successful prosecution under section 2339B is for an individual to knowingly 
attempt or conspire to give some support to a designated group. By this circuitous process, 
which paid lip service to the Supreme Court’s injunction upon imposing guilt by association, 
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criminal syndicalism offences had been all but reanimated as material-support offences 
attendant upon FTO designation. 
Following the 9/11 attacks the definition of ‘material support or resources’ was 
extended by the USA Patriot Act to encompass providing ‘expert advice or assistance’,106 and 
then extended again (and clarificatory definitions added) in the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
107
 By these progressive extensions, ‘material support’ 
under section 2339B came to curtail almost any engagement with a designated group: 
 
Providing property ... or service, including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who 
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 
 
Before 9/11 prosecutions under section 2339B had been ‘few and far between’.108 After the 
attacks the extended material-support offence became the ‘lynchpin’109 of US criminal justice 
responses to terrorism. It enabled preventative action against the early stages of a terrorist 
plot and extended the reach of the criminal law over peripheral actors; ‘support’ does not 
have to advance any specific attack, it simply has to be intentionally provided to a listed FTO 
which the defendant knows to be engaged in terrorism.
110
 Because prosecutors can introduce 
information about suspects’ general political beliefs to evidence the requisite elements of 
mens rea, jurors can come to be more influenced by such opinions than any actual activity. 
This covers subtly different territory to section 2339A, its ‘close cousin’111 offence. Although 
section 2339A does not require the prosecution to establish a link to a specific FTO, the 
defendant must ‘provide support or resources with the knowledge or intent that such 
resources be used to commit specific violent crimes’.112 For David Cole this system of 
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interlinking offences ‘is for all practical purposes indistinguishable from a law imposing guilt 
for mere membership in a proscribed group’.113  
 Such claims were addressed by the Supreme Court in Holder v Humanitarian Law 
Project,
114
 in which the plaintiff pressure group challenged the constitutionality of section 
2339B on the basis that it was vague and criminalised the provision of any support to 
designated groups (including training in international humanitarian and human rights law) 
without the prosecution having to establish that the support contributed to terrorist violence. 
Delivering the six-judge majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts considered that association 
rights were not engaged as the offences in question stopped short of an outright ban on 
membership.
115
 Freedom of association therefore protects no more than bare association, and 
permits neither meaningful activity on a FTO’s behalf, which would amount to providing 
personnel, nor the payment of membership fees, which would constitute providing funds.
116
 
Even where such support is not directed towards violent ends, its criminalisation under 
section 2339B is constitutionally acceptable because it allows a terrorist group to transfer 
other resources towards political violence.
117
 This meant that any advocacy conducted in 
coordination with, or under the direction of, a FTO could be restricted notwithstanding First 
Amendment concerns.
118
 This prohibition of coordinated speech gives little practical 
guidance as to the degree of coordination necessary and whether unilateral advocacy in 
support of a FTO could be criminal.
119
 The three-judge minority opinion, delivered by Justice 
Breyer, would have imposed a limiting construction on section 2339B, ‘criminalizing First-
Amendment-protected pure speech and association only when the defendant knows or intends 
that those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist actions’.120  
 After Holder, in United States v Mehanna, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
a District Court judge, conducting a trial in which a section 2339B offence was at issue, had 
‘appropriately treated the question of whether enough coordination existed to criminalise the 
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defendant’s translations as factbound and left that question to the jury’.121 The Supreme 
Court’s refusal to review this conviction indicates that it is content to allow the lower courts 
to adopt this jury-led approach to the concept of coordinated advocacy. Although bare 
membership or the profession of membership is not criminalised, as they are under the UK’s 
Terrorism Act 2000, the need for some speech or action to evidence intention under section 
2339B means that in practice the two regimes cover very similar conduct.
122
 Moreover, 
treating affiliated organisations as falling under the al Qaeda listing closely mirrors the 
umbrella approach adopted by the UK courts.  
 The focus of successive US Administrations’ efforts to construct a designation regime 
has been on securing minimal compliance with constitutional rights. The restriction of the 
regime to foreign organisations, for example, is the product of the gradual introduction of 
these measures into general criminal law by way of immigration law, and an evident caution 
where First Amendment concerns are at issue, but serves no security purpose.
123
 One 
beneficial side-effect for the executive of this restriction upon the regime is that judicial 
review of a FTO’s designation is restricted by the long-standing reluctance of the courts to 
question executive action in pursuit of foreign-policy goals. In one of the earliest challenges 
to a designation decision, in Humanitarian Law Project v Reno,
124
 the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals set the standard that would remain in place after 9/11: 
 
So the heart of the matter is whether [the designation regime] is well enough tailored to 
its end of preventing the United States from being used as a base for terrorist 
fundraising. Because the judgment of how best to achieve that end is strongly bound up 
with foreign policy considerations, we must allow the political branches wide latitude 
in selecting the means to bring about the desired goal.
125
 
 
Well might Wadie Said assert that the designation of a group ‘should necessitate stronger 
proof that the FTO is an actual threat to national security, not merely a “foreign policy 
interest”’ as required under the current law,126 but the US courts remain singularly reluctant 
to evaluate the intelligence basis for designation orders as falling within the Executive 
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Branch’s broad discretion over foreign affairs.127 The ill effects of this judicial reluctance are 
partially mitigated by the State Department’s review of its own FTO list, which has seen 
several organisations de-listed since 9/11, but this review is a far cry from independent 
scrutiny of the executive decision. As Julie Shapiro notes, ‘[t]he combination of statutory 
breadth and the lack of judicial oversight empowers the Executive Branch to pick and choose 
– with relative ease – which groups to label as terrorists’.128 
 Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the designation system 
and its attendant offences, the resultant security dividend remains open to question. Andrew 
Peterson is sharply critical of the operation of section 2339B where ‘new or unrecognized 
groups’129 are at issue: 
 
The current approach sends the wrong message by targeting a list of organizations, 
rather than a type of conduct. Even when it reaches its intended audience, the signal is 
often too late. Section 2339B only deters contributions after an organization is listed, 
and terrorist violence is a prerequisite to listing. … If the goal of the material support 
statutes is to prevent terrorism, conviction should not require a predicate terrorist act.
130
 
 
For Peterson, this inadequacy is matched by limitations afflicting section 2339A. Although 
this provision does not require support to be provided to a listed group, it does require an 
intention on the part of the supporter to aid terrorist activity, an intention which Peterson 
considers ‘extremely hard’ to evidence.131 Together, these limitations supposedly restrict the 
material-support offences as pre-emptive counter-terrorism measures. These claims, however, 
underplay the mutually-supporting nature of sections 2339A and 2339B, which allow 
prosecutors to tailor charges to fit the available evidence. As a question of fact, which Federal 
Courts have been willing to leave to juries, prosecutors enjoy considerable leeway to argue 
that a “new” organisation actually amounts to an offshoot of a parent umbrella group like al 
Qaeda for the purpose of 2339B.
132
 If no evident link to a listed FTO exists, then section 
2339A can fill in, by criminalising conduct as limited as ‘providing one’s self as personnel to 
others with the goal of assisting in the commission of, or simply preparation for the 
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commission of, a predicate offence (including an offence in the nature of a conspiracy)’.133 
The material-support offences might therefore pose a still greater risk to liberal democratic 
values than have been evidenced to date. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump pledged 
increasingly ‘aggressive’ use of these provisions, which potentially points to speculative 
prosecutions of more equivocal activity.
134
 The ability of Federal prosecutors to use 
intercepted communications as evidence moreover provides an avenue for establishing 
intention not open to their UK counterparts.
135
 These considerations narrow what, on paper, 
appears to be the gulf between the UK and US approaches to terrorist organisations. Or they 
would have done so, but for the expansion of UK proscription powers since 2001. 
 
The UK Proscription Regime and the Post-9/11 Threat 
 
September 2001 found the UK’s proscription regime much more developed than the US 
system of designation. In the absence of any strict constitutional injunction against guilt by 
association, and with common law principles of criminalisation flexible when national 
security is at issue, the UK Government found no immediate need to overhaul the 
membership and support offences attendant upon proscription in the wake of the attacks.
136
 
Senior judges have subsequently endorsed the UK’s approach: 
 
Criminalising membership serves a legitimate purpose by making it difficult for 
members of the organisation to demonstrate publicly in a manner that affronts law-
abiding members of the public. Moreover, not only do people by their mere 
membership give credence to the claims of the organisation but, in addition, members 
are a potential network of people who may be called on to act for the organisation at 
some time in the future, even if they have not yet done so. It follows that it is no 
defence for most members of the organisation to show that they have never taken an 
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active part in the activities of the organisation. The crime is being a member, not being 
an active member.
137
 
 
Criminal sanction even extends to mere profession of membership, which has the potential to 
‘contribute to an exaggerated impression of the strength of the organisation in question’.138  
These offences continued to be the prosecutorial response of choice to terrorism in 
Northern Ireland,
139
 but their usefulness in that context could not mask growing concerns that 
proscription ‘might not fit with the post-September 11 paradigm’.140 In an environment in 
which terrorist groups fractured (exemplified by the Real IRA and Continuity IRA, hard-line 
factions which sheared off the Provisional IRA when it committed to the Northern Ireland 
peace process) or were naturally fluid (as exemplified by al Qaeda’s affiliates) the 
retrospective nature of the proscription regime left it in danger of obsolescence.
141
 The first 
efforts to keep the proscription regime relevant to the changing terrorist threat were judge-
led, resulting from the failed prosecution of a four alleged Real IRA members. The trial 
collapsed on the basis that the Real IRA was not a banned organisation; the “Irish Republican 
Army” was the group listed in Schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and the Real IRA had 
been formed as an organisation distinct from other groups describing themselves as “the 
IRA”. When the Attorney General referred this interpretation of the Terrorism Act to the 
appellate courts, the House of Lords found no difficulty, however, in reading Schedule 2 ‘to 
embrace all emanations, manifestations and representations of the IRA, whatever their 
relationship to each other’.142 This decision allowed prosecutors to continue to pursue new 
manifestations under the umbrella term IRA without the need for specific proscription of 
such groups. It also opened up the possibility of treating al Qaeda and its affiliates in the 
same manner, on the basis that al Qaeda is ‘in truth a name which often represents a set of 
strategies, philosophies and inspirations and which can be assumed as a nom de guerre by 
those who are so stirred’.143 
 In the Terrorism Act 2006 Parliament facilitated the process by which the Home 
Secretary can make a new entry on the list of banned organisations to cover a manifestation 
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or new alias for an already proscribed group.
144
 In cases where prosecutors can establish ‘that 
an organisation is the same as an organisation listed in Schedule 2’,145 this statute also 
permitted membership/support prosecutions even if the new group name was not listed at the 
time when the impugned conduct took place. By this mechanism, drawing heavily upon the 
interpretation adopted by the House of Lords in R v Z,
146
 proscription gained a prospective 
force which circumvented the need for a cat-and-mouse game of name changes and fresh 
proscription orders. Some judges have also shown considerable flexibility towards what 
activity constitutes membership, on the basis that ‘[a] criminal association is inherently more 
likely to lack formality than an innocent one’.147 Under this approach, by which the 
involvement of an organisation can be inferred by evidence of structured interactions between 
individuals (such as one person issuing orders to another), successful membership 
prosecutions of all of those linked to a suspected terrorist cell could follow from evidence 
affiliating any of them to a banned group.  
 Parliament also reconsidered the range of conduct which could justify proscription 
amid concerns, after the July 2005 attacks on the London transport network, that 
“cheerleader” organisations were playing a role in radicalising individuals. Groups which 
promoted or encouraged terrorism fell within the ambit of section 3 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 as enacted, even if they did not participate in violence,
148
 but statements by a group’s 
leadership which praised past terrorist acts but did not advocate future attacks, could not 
provide the basis for a banning order. The Terrorism Act 2006 therefore extended the 
meaning of promoting or encouraging terrorism to encompass glorification (including ‘any 
form of praise or celebration’) of terrorist acts with a view to their emulation.149 A further 
enhancement of the proscription regime was to extend its geographical reach. Membership of 
a group banned by the UK Parliament can now be prosecuted as an offence of universal 
jurisdiction, criminalising the overseas membership of listed organisations.
150
 The reach and 
impact of proscription have therefore been enhanced, even if ‘significant interference with 
human rights is in issue’.151  
                                                 
144
 Terrorism Act 2000, s.3(6) (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006, s.22(2)). 
145
 ibid., s.3(9) (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006, s.22(2)). 
146
 R v Z, above n.142. 
147
 R v Ahmed [2011] EWCA Crim 184; [2011] Crim LR 734, [87]. In this case the defendants professed 
membership of Al Qaeda to third parties.  
148
 Terrorism Act 2000, s.3(5)(c). 
149
 ibid., s.3(5A)-s.3(5C) (as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006, s.21). 
150
 Terrorism Act 2006, s.17(2)(c). 
151
 Home Secretary v Lord Alton, above n.96, [43] (Lord Phillips). 
24 
 
 These extensions have wrenched the proscription power from its theoretical moorings 
as an exceptional response required by ‘the special threat posed by terrorist organisations to 
the security of the State and the safety of the public’.152 Proscription can be a justifiable 
response given the threat political violence poses to a liberal democracy; ‘the (immoral) 
choice to join an exclusively terrorist organisation is a dangerous and culpable conduct that 
seems sufficiently linked to the eventual harm to justify prosecution’.153 When banning 
membership of a group is closely tied to its involvement in political violence the European 
Court has accepted this as an acceptable ascription of criminality.
154
 Indeed, judicial efforts to 
facilitate the use of proscription could have been intended to diminish the need for executive 
counter-terrorism measures beyond the criminal justice system.
155
 Each extension of 
proscription, however, has weakened the connection between an individual’s membership of 
a group and political violence, as evident in the UK Government’s efforts to constrain 
offshoots of al Muhajiroun. Founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad in 1996, this group was 
regarded by UK authorities as a vehicle for radicalisation, even though it was not directly 
involved in terrorist attacks. Subject to increasingly close surveillance from 2001 onwards, al 
Muhajiroun was on the verge of being proscribed for promoting violence when it was wound 
up in 2004. Within months of the Terrorism Act 2006 coming into effect the Government 
banned two successor groups, al Ghurabaa and the Saviour Sect/Saved Sect, not for 
involvement in political violence, but for its glorification.
156
 Since then, in January 2010,
157
 
June 2011
158
 and June 2014
159
 the Government has issued curt notices officially recognising a 
slew of names as being aliases for this organisation. Even before these official proscription 
notices are promulgated, moreover, membership of any of these groups could be prosecuted 
by virtue of their being ‘the same’ as an already banned organisation.160   
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 The chilling effect upon freedom of expression and association resultant from 
proscription should not be underestimated.
161
 Proscription impacts upon ‘persons who are not 
members of the proscribed organisation, but merely of the ethnic community from which the 
organisation derives its support’.162 And the limits of the offence of providing support for a 
banned group remains vague under the statute, prompting calls for specific examples to be 
listed.
163
 The threat of membership or support offences carrying prison sentences of up to ten 
years,
164
 hangs over any person who might be attracted to a group which projects itself as 
staunchly opposed to UK policy in the Middle East or committed to the introduction of 
Sharia Law. These ends are not, of themselves, violent or criminal, but potential members 
will have no way of knowing if the group in question is a new alias for al Muhajiroun (and 
thereby under the Terrorism Act ‘the same’ organisation,165 even if the new name is not yet 
listed). Indeed, the banning of its satellite group Islam4UK in 2010 was accompanied by 
considerable speculation that it was more closely connected to Anjem Choudary’s proposals 
for a provocative march through Wootton Bassett (a town close to RAF Lyneham associated 
with the repatriation of UK service personnel killed in action in Iraq and Afghanistan), rather 
than evidence that their members were plotting terrorist attacks.
166
 But when a group is 
explicitly banned for glorifying terrorism, its connections to terrorist activities can be 
tenuous. When it came to banning National Action in 2016
167
 (and some of its offshoots in 
2017
168
) the UK Government acted on the basis that the group was glorifying terrorism 
through social media accounts it controlled disseminating messages and images which 
condoned and celebrated the murder of Jo Cox MP and the Pulse Nightclub attack in 
Orlando; ‘If we allow such events to be celebrated and encouraged, we live with the risk that 
they will be repeated’.169 
 That a group’s adherents do not, themselves, hear or approve any statement that 
glorifies terrorism is irrelevant for the purposes of their criminal liability. In these 
circumstances the only course of action safe from criminal sanction for an individual is to 
avoid such groups. Dissenting speech, rather than terrorism, comes to be constrained by 
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law.
170
 When ‘mutual respect and shared citizenship’171 have been acknowledged to provide 
the surest barrier against radicalisation, uses of proscription which threaten the expression of 
dissenting opinion sustain narratives that certain groups in society enjoy second-class 
citizenship. In the face of mounting political rhetoric surrounding the banning of groups, and 
frequent use of the membership offences as the basis for counter-terrorism arrests, cautious 
prosecutorial approaches will not suffice to alleviate such concerns.
172
 The threat of 
criminalisation, without an official ban on a particular name, through an all-but strict liability 
offence,
173
 sunders the principle that the criminal law should be clear enough to guide 
conduct, raising the possibility of fresh Articles 10 and 11 ECHR challenges.  
 Even though the UK legislation makes more allowance for oversight of proscription 
than exists under the US designation regime, groups can struggle to be deproscribed even if 
they no longer pose a terrorist threat. The Home Office used to periodically review the list of 
banned groups but, with ministers eager to be seen to be toughening counter-terrorism 
responses in light of the emergent Islamic State threat, this check was discontinued in 
2014.
174
 Groups or affected individuals must now apply to the Home Secretary before 
deproscription will be considered.
175
 Few people are eager to submit themselves to the 
scrutiny that inevitably attends such a request, and applications have been rare. Should a 
group have the means to do so, it can challenge the rejection of such an application before the 
Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC).
176
 This specialist tribunal is in 
certain respects better placed than the ordinary courts to assess the rationale behind a 
particular ban, being able to consider materials which the security services would not disclose 
in open court.
177
 The cost, however, is to open justice. The POAC operates in closed session 
to consider such material, and its public determinations might not cover the full reasoning 
behind its decision. The applicants’ interests in such proceedings are represented by Special 
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Advocates, not their chosen representatives.
178
 Moreover, although it is styled as an appellate 
body, the POAC is limited to reviewing the Home Secretary’s decisions on the basis of 
judicial review principles.
179
 For all of the promises of ‘intense scrutiny’ given the human 
rights at stake, this effectively means that only perverse listing decisions are open to 
challenge.
180
 Much as the European Court of Human Rights has accommodated similar 
special procedures given the national security interest at stake in cases involving the 
restriction of an individual’s liberty,181 in practice the limitations imposed upon the POAC 
operate to reinforce the substantive restrictions upon expression and association. This calls 
into question whether sufficient safeguards exist to establish that the UK’s proscription 
regime really is ‘prescribed by law’ under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. Given the degree to 
which overturning a ban would amount to a ‘propaganda victory’ for an affected group, the 
POAC operates to provide a veneer of oversight whilst minimising the possibility of 
embarrassing defeats for the government.
182
 This system is not immune from legal challenge. 
Gillan v United Kingdom saw the European Court closely evaluate the effectiveness of 
safeguard processes in determining whether this requirement for restricting qualified rights 
was fulfilled in the context of police stop-and-search powers for counter-terrorism 
purposes.
183
 An Article 10 or 11 ECHR challenge by a banned group could likewise expose 
the limitations in an oversight system which is, at best, designed to appear robust.  
 No matter how effective the POAC is in reviewing the Home Secretary’s listing 
decisions, its secretive processes have hardly encouraged challenges. It gives all the 
appearances of a body designed to rubber stamp executive decisions. On the one occasion 
when the POAC has accepted the contention that a banned group, the People’s Mojahadeen 
of Iran (PMOI), was not concerned in terrorism, the Court of Appeal upheld this finding (as 
discussed above)
184
 and a deproscription order resulted.
185
 But as Keith Ewing notes, few 
banned groups can rely upon ‘the same quality of establishment support’ to advance their 
cause as the PMOI and, in any event, this one-off display of independence appeared to 
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vindicate the POAC oversight system at little cost to official policy.
186
 Another application by 
the International Sikh Youth Federation to the POAC in 2015 obliged the UK Government, 
which had previously rejected an application for deproscription,
187
 to delist the group.
188
 The 
UK Government was quick, in this instance, to assert that diplomatic pressure from India ‘did 
not lead to the ban on the ISYF having been maintained since 2001’ and that a group will 
only remain banned ‘if there is compelling evidence to support a reasonable belief that it is 
currently concerned in terrorism’.189 In spite of these developments, given the limited use 
made of the POAC, the UK system has in practice generated little pressure on the executive 
to relinquish these constraints on association and expression where they are no longer 
necessary. 
Even these powers are insufficient for Theresa May, who as Home Secretary informed 
the 2014 Conservative Party Conference that: 
 
I want to see new banning orders for extremist groups that fall short of the existing laws 
relating to terrorism. I want to see new civil powers to target extremists who stay just 
within the law but still spread poisonous hatred. So both policies – Banning Orders and 
Extremism Disruption Orders – will be in the next Conservative manifesto.190 
 
In spite of the official 2011 review of counter-terrorism powers concluding that banning 
groups on the basis that they incite hatred would be ‘strikingly illiberal’,191 proscription’s 
deterrent effect evidently maintains a sufficient hold over UK security policy to eclipse its 
practical shortcomings and supposedly exceptional nature. Years after Theresa May’s pledge, 
however, new legislative proposals have yet to take shape (although they could well emerge 
again). Even the Home Office has acknowledged the risk that counter-extremism banning 
orders could ‘close down debate or limit free speech’.192 Within the UK Government a 
predilection for proscription might exist, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to extend 
these powers without further attenuating the connection between banning a group and 
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political violence. If this connection breaks proscription becomes, quite simply, a means of 
constraining political thought adjudged deviant by the authorities.
193
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Notwithstanding the prominence accorded to proscription within the Terrorism Act 2000 and 
high-profile convictions such as Anjem Choudary for supporting Islamic State,
194
 the 
difficulties of applying these powers to al Qaeda-inspired terrorism have often relegated them 
to a peripheral role in UK counter-terrorism prosecutions since 9/11.
195
 By contrast, the US 
designation system is on paper a pale shadow of the UK’s proscription regime, but compliant 
interpretation by the higher federal courts has put the material support offences at the heart of 
US domestic counter-terrorism policy. Along these very different arcs, the mechanisms for 
proscribing terrorist groups in the UK and of designating FTOs in the US tell us much about 
these two countries’ approaches to counter terrorism under the criminal law. In the UK 
proscription has been gradually transformed from a means of tackling organisations which 
are engaged in political violence to a regime covering groups which talk, even obliquely, of 
violence but which do not engage in it. Proscription orders are a convenient means to signal 
that the Home Office is managing the terror threat, and it is therefore unsurprising that their 
use has soared in recent years.
196
 But given the limited number of convictions for proscription 
offences, successive extensions to the UK’s proscription regime seem geared more towards 
exerting social control than punishing criminal activity. According to Max Hill, the 
independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, the UK ‘should not criminalise thought 
without action or preparation for action’ through new counter-extremism banning orders.197 
Welcome as this shot across the UK Government’s bows might be, this is a line that has, in 
important respects, already been crossed.  
If the UK has stretched the domestic proscription regime to the point of ‘corruption’198 
of criminal law standards, in the US counter-terrorism policy has been adapted to fit the 
available criminal offences. For years after the 9/11 attacks the designation regime and 
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attendant offences encouraged the authorities to treat groups like al Qaeda as centralised 
multi-national organisations, replete with sophisticated recruitment mechanisms. Marc 
Sageman characterises the resultant US domestic counter-terrorism policy as a “ghost chase” 
for ‘alleged al Qaeda spotters and recruiters, under the guise of material support for 
terrorism’.199 The “al Qaeda recruiters” whom defendants have aided have almost always 
turned out to be Federal agents.
200
 The US Supreme Court’s majority in Holder would have 
done better to heed Justice Jackson’s warning that ‘[i]n times of anxiety, the public demands 
haste and a show of zeal on the part of judges, whose real duty is neutrality and 
detachment’.201 Their acceptance that a broad reading of the material-support offences is 
compatible with the First Amendment gave way to the desires of the executive branch, rather 
than its needs, and created an environment in which most terrorism prosecutions in the US 
could be poured into a mould which is shorn of meaningful protections. Time will tell what 
the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice will make of such powers. 
                                                 
199
 Marc Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research’ (2014) 26 Terrorism and Political Violence 565, 
567. 
200
 See United States v Augustin (11th Cir., 2011) 661 F.3d 1105 and United States v Farhane (2nd Cir., 2011) 
634 F.3d 127. 
201
 Robert Jackson, ‘Wartime Security and Liberty under Law’ (1951) 1 Buffalo Law Review 103, 112.  
